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SILENCING FOX: THE CHILLING EFFECT 
OF THE FCC’S INDECENT SPEECH POLICY 
Abstract: On July 13, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC struck down the FCC’s indecent 
speech policy, reasoning that the policy was unconstitutionally vague. The 
Second Circuit’s decision has been viewed as a victory for broadcasters 
and others who thought the FCC’s indecent speech policy suppressed 
constitutionally protected speech. This Comment argues that the decision 
in Fox was correct and appropriately set the stage for the Supreme Court 
to overturn a seemingly outdated precedent set in the Court’s 1978 deci-
sion, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. 
Introduction 
 In its July 13, 2010 decision in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down the Federal 
Communications Commission’s (FCC) indecent speech policy as un-
constitutionally vague, signaling a huge win for broadcasters and others 
who thought the FCC’s policy suppressed constitutionally protected 
speech.1 The vagueness of the policy guidelines, the Second Circuit 
reasoned, created a chilling effect that extended beyond the fleeting 
expletives—single, unexpected uses of expletives—the FCC had in-
tended to regulate.2 
 Fox is an important case in the development of First Amendment 
speech law.3 As a result of the court’s opinion, if the FCC wants to use 
its regulatory powers against indecent speech, it must now revise its pol-
icy such that broadcasters have a clear understanding of what type of 
speech will, in fact, be deemed indecent.4 Also, in noting that the me-
dia landscape has changed since the landmark 1978 U.S. Supreme 
Court case FCC v. Pacifica Foundation—and questioning whether the 
level of scrutiny currently placed on the restrictions on broadcast 
speech is appropriate—the Second Circuit set the stage for the Su-
preme Court to overturn its seemingly outdated precedent in Pacifica.5 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See 613 F.3d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 2010). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. at 319–23. 
5 Id. at 326–27 (discussing the changes in the media landscape since FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)). In Pacifica, the Supreme Court ruled that the FCC could, in 
15 
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 Part I of this Comment examines the parameters of the FCC’s regu-
latory powers, with an emphasis on how various courts addressed chal-
lenges to the FCC’s application of such powers prior to Fox.6 Part II ex-
amines how the Second Circuit reached its decision in Fox, focusing on 
the court’s analysis of the FCC’s approach to determining which words 
or expressions are patently offensive.7 Finally, Part III argues that, in 
reaching its decision in Fox, the Second Circuit appropriately ensured 
that constitutionally protected speech would no longer be suppressed, 
and laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court to overturn Pacifica.8 
I. Determining the FCC’s Parameters 
 The FCC began regulating broadcast speech in 1948 when 18 
U.S.C. § 1464 was incorporated into the criminal code.9 Section 1464 
states that “[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane lan-
guage by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title 
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”10 Although the pas-
sage of the Communications Act Amendments of 1960 authorized the 
FCC to impose fines for violations of § 1464,11 it was not until 1975 that 
the FCC first used its authority to regulate speech it ruled indecent.12 
In that year, the FCC brought forfeiture proceedings against the 
Pacifica Foundation, the broadcaster responsible for airing George 
Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue, in which the comedian intention-
ally repeated several expletives.13 
                                                                                                                     
 In those proceedings, the FCC defined indecent speech as “lan-
guage that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by con-
temporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or 
excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a rea-
 
the specific context of that case, restrict indecent speech not meeting the definition of 
obscenity. 438 U.S. at 744. In its decision, the Court, relying on what it described as the 
pervasive nature of broadcast media as well as its accessibility to children, noted that re-
strictions on broadcast speech should be subject to a lower level of scrutiny than other 
forms of media. Id. at 748–49. 
6 See infra notes 9–46 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 47–75 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 76–105 and accompanying text. 
9 See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, ch. 645, § 1464, 62 Stat. 683, 769. 
10 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006). 
11 See Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-752, § 7(a), 74 Stat. 889, 894 (codified at 47 
U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(1)(D) (West 2001 & Supp. 2010)). 
12 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 2010). 
13 Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 95 
(1975). 
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sonable risk that children may be in the audience.”14 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, upon granting Pacifica’s petition for re-
view, ruled that the definition was vague and overly broad, and implied 
that the FCC’s policy could lead to censorship of constitutionally pro-
tected speech.15 The FCC appealed, leading to the landmark 1978 Su-
preme Court decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.16 
 In Pacifica, the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the FCC could 
impose a fine in the particular context presented in the case.17 In its 
decision, the Court deliberately distinguished broadcast media from 
other forms of communication.18 First, the Court noted that broadcast 
media should receive limited First Amendment protection because, 
unlike other forms of communication, broadcast media have a “perva-
sive presence in the lives of all Americans.”19 Second, the nature of 
broadcast television made it “uniquely accessible to children,” even 
those who could not yet read.20 The Court emphasized the narrowness 
of its holding, however, noting that it did not address whether fleeting 
expletives were regulable.21 
 For many years after Pacifica, the FCC’s policy was to apply its en-
forcement powers only against broadcasters airing the seven specific 
words in the Carlin monologue that the agency deemed indecent.22 In 
1987, however, the FCC concluded that its policy, although easily en-
forceable, could no longer be justified.23 Instead, the FCC adopted a 
more contextual approach and abandoned its policy of focusing on a 
set list of words.24 
                                                                                                                      
14 Id. at 98. 
15 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 556 F.2d 9, 16–18 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev’d, 438 U.S. 726 
(1978). 
16 438 U.S. at 734. 
17 Id. at 750–51. 
18 Id. at 748–49. 
19 Id. at 748. 
20 Id. at 749. 
21 See id. at 750; id. at 760–61 (Powell, J., concurring). 
22 See Fox, 613 F.3d at 321. See generally Michael Kaneb, Note, Neither Realistic Nor Consti-
tutionally Sound: The Problem of the FCC’s Community Standard for Broadcast Indecency Determina-
tions, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1081, 1105 (2008) (highlighting the FCC’s narrow indecency policy 
in the decade after Pacifica). 
23 Infinity Broad. Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 930 (1987). The FCC concluded that although 
enforcement was easier under the old policy, “it could lead to anomalous results that could 
not be justified.” Id. It worried that broadcasters would simply avoid certain words and thus 
get around the true purpose behind the policy—keeping patently offensive language out 
of broadcast speech. Id. 
24 Id. at 934. 
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 In order to provide broadcasters with guidance regarding its en-
forcement policies, the FCC released a policy statement in 2001 ex-
plaining that an indecency finding involves two determinations: (1) 
whether the material in question describes or depicts “sexual or excre-
tory organs or activities”; and (2) whether the broadcast is “patently 
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the 
broadcast medium.”25 The statement also reiterated the long-standing 
policy that fleeting expletives were per se not indecent.26 
 In 2004, however, the FCC changed its fleeting expletives policy.27 
Following the 2003 Golden Globe Awards, where the musician Bono 
exclaimed “[t]his is really, really, fucking brilliant” after receiving an 
award, several complaints were filed with the FCC.28 In response to the 
complaints, the FCC explained in a declaratory order, known as the 
Golden Globe Awards Order, that it found the word “fuck” to be “one of 
the most vulgar, graphic, and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in 
the English language” and, as a result, found the fleeting manner of its 
use irrelevant.29 The FCC was no longer willing to view fleeting exple-
tives as per se not indecent.30 This change laid the groundwork for 
F 1 
 The first step toward Fox took place when several parties, including 
NBC Universal, Inc., filed petitions before the FCC asking the agency to 
reconsider its new, broader enforcement policy.
ox.3
32 While these petitions 
were pending, the FCC released another declaratory order, the Omni-
                                                                                                                      
25 In re Industry Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8002 
(2001). In this policy statement, the FCC highlighted three factors it would take into con-
sideration when determining whether a broadcast was patently offensive: (1) “the explicit-
ness or graphic nature of the description or depiction”; (2) “whether the material dwells 
on or repeats at length the description or depiction”; and (3) “whether the material ap-
pea used to titillate, or whether the material appears to have been pre-
sen
Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding the Airing of 
the  Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4979 (2004). 
 fine permitted by the FCC to $325,000, 
ther  stakes for broadcasting indecent material. See 47 U.S.C.A. 
§ 50 West 2001 & Supp. 2010). 
rs to pander or is 
ted for its shock value.” Id. at 8003. 
26 Id. at 8008–09. 
27 See In re Complaints 
“Golden Globe
28 Id. at 4975, 4976 n.4. 
29 Id. at 4979. 
30 Id. While the FCC was broadening its enforcement policy, Congress amended 47 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(2)(C)(iii), to set the maximum
eby greatly increasing the
3(b)(2)(C)(iii) (
31 See 613 F.3d at 322–23. 
32 See id. at 323. 
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bus Order, in which it reaffirmed its new policy.33 The Omnibus Order 
found several broadcasts indecent and profane under the Golden 
Globe Awards standard as a result of fleeting expletives.34 For example, 
during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, the singer Cher accepted an 
award and declared, “People have been telling me I’m on the way out 
every year, right? So fuck ‘em.”35 During the 2003 Billboard Music 
Awards, Nicole Richie, when discussing her TV show The Simple Life, 
remarked, “Have you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It’s 
not so fucking simple.”36 By deeming these broadcasts indecent, the 
FCC reaffirmed its policy of finding any use of the word “fuck” to be 
presumptively indecent and broadened its policy by applying the same 
nd
t, the court 
id n
                                                                                                                     
fi ing to any use of the word “shit.”37 
 Although the FCC issued a third declaratory order, the Remand 
Order, in November 2006, in which it reversed its findings regarding a 
few shows, it upheld its earlier decision that the 2002 and 2003 Bill-
board Music Awards were indecent.38 After the Remand Order was is-
sued, the petitioners asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit for review.39 The Second Circuit held that the FCC’s indecent 
speech policy was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, as the FCC had not adequately explained the reasoning 
behind changing its fleeting expletives policy.40 As a resul
d ot need to reach the constitutional issues presented.41 
 
33 See In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 
and Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2669 (2006). 
34 Id. at 2690–93, 2696–99. 
35 Id. at 2690. 
36 Id. at 2692–93 n.164. Similarly, a broadcast of the television show NYPD Blue was de-
clared indecent as a result of the use of the word “bullshit,” and a broadcast of the televi-
sion show The Early Show was deemed indecent as a result of a guest using the word “bull-
shitter” during a broadcast. Id. at 2696–99. 
37 Id. at 2691, 2699–2700. 
38 In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 and 
Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13299 (2006). In the Remand Order, the FCC noted that 
any distinction made between expletives and descriptions or depictions of sexual or excre-
tory functions does not make sense as the offensive nature comes from the underlying 
meaning of the words and descriptions. Id. at 13308. An important caveat included by the 
FCC in the Remand Order was the declaration that expletives “integral” to an artistic work 
or taking place during a “bona fide” news interview might not violate the indecency stan-
dard—though the FCC was quick to clarify that there was no outright news exemption. See 
id. at 13327. 
39 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 446 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. 
Ct. 1800 (2009). 
40 See id. at 447. 
41 See id. 
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 The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s ruling, holding 
that the FCC’s fleeting expletives policy was not arbitrary and capri-
cious.42 Further, like the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court did not 
reach the constitutional issues in the case, noting that it would go 
against normal procedures to address such issues without a lower court 
opinion.43 As such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Sec-
nd
 court ultimately de-




continued viability of the Pacifica rationale.51 Although indecent speech 
o  Circuit to determine whether the FCC’s indecent speech policy 
violated the First Amendment.44 
 On remand, the Second Circuit focused primarily on the constitu-
tionality of the FCC’s indecency guidelines.45 The
ines as unconstitutionally vague.46 
II. The Second Circuit’s Rationale 
 At the heart of Fox lies the FCC’s indecent speech policy.47 The 
petitioners argued that the FCC’s guidelines were so vague that they as 
broadcasters could not possibly determine what would be deemed in-
decent by the FCC.48 The FCC, in response, argued that its policy and 
subsequent decisions provided sufficient notice as to what would be 
considered indecent.49 The Second Circuit ultimately struck down the 
FCC’s guidelines, noting that disallowing all patently offensive refer-
ences to sexual or excretory organs or activities w
br dcasters with appropriate guidelines as to what constitutes “pat-
ently offensive” references effectively chills speech.50 
 Recognizing that it was bound by the 1978 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in FCC v. Pacifica, the court in Fox limited its holding to the 
vagueness issue but nonetheless indicated its dissatisfaction with the 
                                                                                                                      
42 129 S. Ct. at 1819. The Court reasoned that the FCC could logically conclude that as 
a result of the increasing presence of foul language and the abrasive nature of other forms 
of m a tighter regulation of broadcast speech was proper as such regulation would 
prov for children. Id. 
t 319. 
, 319 (2d Cir. 2010). 
edia, 
ide a safe environment 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Fox, 613 F.3d a
46 Id. 
47 See 613 F.3d 317
48 See id. at 328. 
49 Id. at 330. 
50 Id. at 319, 335. 
51 See id. at 320–21. 
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normally gets full First Amendment protection,52 the Supreme Court 
has treated broadcast radio and television differently than other forms 
of communication in its application of the First Amendment.53 The Su-
preme Court generally applies strict scrutiny to content-based restric-
tions; broadcast speech, however, is subject to a type of intermediate 
scrutiny.54 Although the court in Fox indicated it would like to move 
away from the Pacifica decision applying lower-level scrutiny to broad-
cast speech, it also acknowledged that it could not upset Supreme 




                                                                                                                     
th CC’s indecent speech policy was unconstitutionally vague.56 
 Any regulation that threatens to infringe upon constitutionally pro-
tected rights will generally be subject to some form of vagueness test.57 
Ensuring that a law is not vague serves two key purposes.58 First, it en-
sures that individuals are given fair notice of what is and is not prohib-
ited.59 This is critical in the context of broadcast speech: if broadcasters 
are not clear on whether they will be fined for broadcasting certain con-
tent, there could be a chilling effect on free speech.60 Second, it elim
n s the potential for inconsistent and discriminatory enforcement.61 
 In reaching its decision that the FCC’s indecent speech guidelines 
were unconstitutionally vague, the court in Fox focused on the FCC’s 
approach to determining which words or expressions were patently of-
fensive.62 Although the FCC pointed to the factors it considered in de-
termining whether something was patently offensive, the Second Circuit 
was not satisfied with the FCC’s description of how it applied those fac-
tors.63 In explaining why one word used in an NYPD Blue episode was 
patently offensive and another word was not, for example, the FCC sim-
 
52 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (“[W]here obscen-
ity is not involved, . . . the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not 
justify its suppression.”). 
53 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1961) (“Although broadcasting is 
clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest, differences in the characteristics 
of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.” (in-
ternal citation omitted)). 
54 See Fox, 613 F.3d at 325–26. 
55 See id. at 326–27 (discussing the changes in the media landscape since Pacifica). 
56 Id. at 327. 
57 See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 
(1982). 
58 See Fox, 613 F.3d at 328. 
59 Id. 
60 See id. 
61 Id. 
62 See id. at 330. 
63 See id. 
22 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
ply stated that the patently offensive word was graphic and explicit—one 
of the identified factors—whereas the other word was not.64 Such a reli-
ance on a factor without greater explanation of its application, the court 
reasoned, did not provide broadcasters with sufficient guidance on what 
ul
plemented, it would be difficult, if not 
p
ill set out clear standards with which to 
dg
     
wo d be considered patently offensive in the future.65 
 The Second Circuit also dismissed the FCC’s argument that it 
needed to employ a flexible standard in order to react to an ever-
changing media landscape.66 The Second Circuit interpreted this ar-
gument as the FCC admitting that it could not anticipate what would be 
considered indecent under its policy.67 When the enforcing body can-
not determine what will be indecent, the court reasoned, there is no 
way for broadcasters to be able to do so either.68 Without any certainty 
of how the policy would be im
im ossible, to comply with it.69 
 The FCC also argued that its contextual approach—as opposed to 
an approach that targets a set of pre-identified words and only fines 
broadcasters who use those words in their programming—was the type 
of approach consistent with the Supreme Court’s Pacifica decision.70 
Although the court in Fox acknowledged the Pacifica Court’s emphasiz-
ing the importance of context in its decision, the Second Circuit ex-
plained that this emphasis only served to indicate the limited scope of 
the holding.71 In order to pass constitutional muster, the Fox court stat-
ed, the FCC’s guidelines must st
ju e the particular contexts.72 
 The Second Circuit also characterized the FCC’s presumptive pro-
hibition on the words “fuck” and “shit” —as well as the stated excep-
tions to the prohibition—as riddled with vagueness issues.73 The FCC’s 
policy at the time of Fox was to find the use of either word, or any vari-
ant of either word, as indecent unless it took place during a “bona fide” 
news interview or if the use was essential to the nature of an artistic or 
                                                                                                                 
64 Fox, 613 F.3d at 330. The FCC determined that the use of the word “bullshit” in the 
episode was patently offensive, whereas the use of the words “dick” and “dickhead” was 
not. 
31. 
13 F.3d at 333. 
d. at 331. 
Id. 
65 See id. 
66 Id. at 3
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 330. 
70 Fox, 6
71 Id. 
72 See id. 
73 See i
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educational work.74 The FCC’s application of these exceptions was 
seemingly inconsistent, the court reasoned, and, as such, these excep-
tions once again provided less-than-clear guidelines to broadcasters as 
to what would be deemed indecent.75 
III
 actions would have been a clear violation the First Amend-
en
                                                                                                                     
. The Effects of Fox: Protected Speech Is Truly Protected 
 In declaring the FCC’s indecent speech guidelines unconstitution-
ally vague, the Second Circuit appropriately ensured that broadcasts 
including speech protected by the First Amendment will no longer be 
suppressed.76 The FCC’s vague guidelines promoted self-censorship 
and, due to a lack of adequate guidance as to what would be deemed 
indecent, in effect promoted the suppression of protected speech.77 In 
Fox, the court identified several broadcasters who chose to not air cer-
tain programs, as they were not sure whether certain dialogue in the 
programs would be found indecent.78 Furthermore, such vague guide-
lines gave the FCC the opportunity to suppress particular points of view 
through applying the guidelines inconsistently.79 Had the FCC applied 




ater reversed itself specifically because it occurred during a “bona fide” 
new
 Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 335 (2d Cir. 2010). 
whether they would be fined and, as a result, opted to avoid the 
pote Id. 
ot necessary to depict the realism of interviews with people involved in a 
doc
74 Id. 
75 See id. at 332. The court noted that the FCC found the use of the word “bullshitter” 
on CBS’s The Early Show “shocking and gratuitous” largely because it occurred during a 
news interview, yet l
s interview. Id. 
76 See Fox
77 See id. 
78 Id. at 334. For example, several broadcasters chose not to air 9/11, an award-winning 
documentary on the September 11th World Trade Center attack, as they were not sure 
whether dialogue between firefighters included in the documentary—which included 
expletives—would be considered indecent. Id. Given the FCC’s policy, the broadcasters 
had no way of knowing 
ntial heavy fine. 
79 Id. at 332. 
80 See id. at 333. Although there are no examples where this type of action definitely 
took place, the court pointed to the FCC’s seemingly different treatments of the movie 
Saving Private Ryan and the documentary The Blues to highlight the potential for such ac-
tion. Id. Both broadcasts had the words “fuck” and “shit” used in them, yet the FCC ap-
plied the “artistic necessity” exception to Saving Private Ryan and not to The Blues. Id. 
There is something inherently puzzling, the court reasoned, in concluding that the use of 
such words was necessary to depict the realism of fictional acts in a fictional movie, yet 
such words were n
umentary. Id. 
24 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
 The FCC’s guidelines also forced broadcasters to face similar issues 
with live broadcasts.81 The simple decision facing broadcasters under 
the FCC’s policy was to run the risk of being fined by the FCC on the 
off chance that a fleeting expletive would be muttered, or to give up 
live broadcasts altogether and chill speech that would otherwise have 
aired.82 A perfect screening or delay system is virtually impossible.83 As 
such, even a careful screening of presenters would not keep award win-
ners from using fleeting expletives.84 When vague standards are in 
place, broadcasters are less willing to risk airing content over which 
chilling effect clearly threatens speech pro-
cte
                                                                                                                     
they do not have complete control, even if the odds of airing content 
the FCC will object to are slim.85 
 The FCC’s guidelines suppressed news programming as well.86 As 
the FCC made clear, the “bona fide” news exception was not an abso-
lute exception, but rather an exception applied in the FCC’s discre-
tion.87 As such, it was impossible to know when the FCC would levy 
fines against news programs.88 This resulted in numerous instances 
where broadcasters chose to avoid inviting certain guests on programs 
and dropped coverage of live events in an effort to avoid being fined by 
the FCC.89 Were such a policy to remain in place, such instances would 
inevitably multiply.90 This 
te d by the First Amendment and encapsulates why the Second Cir-
cuit ruled appropriately.91 
 
81 Id. at 334. 
82 See Fox, 613 F.3d at 334. 
83 Id. At the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, for example, Fox had a delay system in 
place and had approved the scripts used by the presenters, but Nicole Richie went off 
script and used three expletives, only the first of which was bleeped out of the broadcast. 
Id. Such precautions did not make Fox immune to the occurrence of fleeting expletives. 
Id. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 See Fox, 613 F.3d at 334–35. 
89 Id. For example, a local news station in Vermont refused to air a political debate be-
cause one of the local politicians involved had previously used expletives during a broad-
cast. Id. Additionally, several Phoenix television stations cut away from live coverage of a 
memorial service for a deceased service member because of language used by the dece-
dent’s family to express grief. Id. at 335. 
90 See id. at 334. 
91 See Aurele Danoff, “Raised Eyebrows” Over Satellite Radio: Has Pacifica Met Its Match?, 
34 Pepp. L. Rev. 743, 772 (2002); Kurt Hunt, The FCC Complaint Process and “Increasing Pub-
lic Unease”: Toward an Apolitical Broadcast Indecency Regime, 14 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. 
Rev. 223, 235 (2007). 
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 By highlighting the changing media landscape, the Second Circuit 
also laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court to overturn its prece-
dent set in the 1978 case FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.92 In Pacifica, the Su-
preme Court distinguished broadcast television from other forms of 
media due, in large part, to its uniquely pervasive presence.93 Broadcast 
television today simply does not have the uniquely pervasive presence 
that it did in 1975.94 At the time of Pacifica, cable television was just 
starting out.95 Today, approximately 98.5 million households subscribe 
to a cable or satellite service and, for those households, the distinction 
between broadcast and non-broadcast channels is insignificant.96 Fur-
ther, social networking sites such as YouTube and Facebook have be-
come quite pervasive, allowing access to videos, movies, and broadcast 
television programs with a simple click of a button.97 The Internet was 
what is available for their kids to watch, thereby negating the concern 
     
in its infancy and such websites were still decades from existence at the 
time of Pacifica.98 
 In Pacifica, the Supreme Court also distinguished broadcast televi-
sion from other forms of media due to its unique accessibility to chil-
dren.99 With today’s technology, however, there are ways to shield chil-
dren from broadcast television programs containing indecent speech.100 
As the court observed in Fox, every television sold in the United States 
since 2000 that is thirteen inches or longer contains a v-chip, a techno-
logical device that allows parents to block television programs based on 
a rating system.101 This played a key role in the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in 2000 in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group.102 There, the 
Court noted that targeted blocking technology allows parents to moni-
tor what children watch without affecting the First Amendment interests 
of willing listeners.103 Using the same logic, parents can now monitor 
                                                                                                                 
92 See id. at 325–27 (discussing the changes in the media landscape since FCC v. Pacifi-
ca F . 
326–27. 
etition in the Market for the Delivery 
of V
ting Business and Cul-
tura s in the Internet Age, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 431, 431–32 (2010). 
ox, 613 F.3d at 326. 
 U.S. 803, 815 (2000). 
ound., 438 U.S. 726 (1978))
93 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. 
94 Fox, 613 F.3d at 
95 Id. at 326. 
96 In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Comp
ideo Programming, 24 F.C.C.R. 542, 546 (2009). 
97 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, YouTube, UGC, and Digital Music: Compe
l Model
98 Id. 




103 See id. 
26 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
e for the Supreme Court to reconsider the 
precedent set in Pacifica.105 
ate, setting up the potential for the Supreme Court to revisit 
Pacifica. 
Christopher Hiserman 
y, 52 B.C. L. Rev. E. Supp. 15 (2011), http://www.bc.edu/bclr/esupp_2011/ 
02_hiserman.pdf. 
                                                                                                                     
that broadcast television is uniquely accessible to children.104 As a result 
of the changing media landscape, the concern about broadcast televi-
sion’s unique presence in the home seems to be outdated and irrele-
vant, thereby making it tim
Conclusion 
 In Fox, the Second Circuit struck down the FCC’s indecent speech 
policy for the second time, this time basing its decision on the unconsti-
tutionally vague nature of the policy. The Second Circuit appropriately 
recognized that under the policy, broadcasters are forced to guess how 
the FCC’s policy will be applied, and ultimately must run the risk of 
chilling protected speech. The Second Circuit also suggested that the 
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